The three basic arguments from evil against the existence of God must be analyzed for their soundness. A classic theodicy, for instance, is usually offered in defense against the logical argument from evil. According to this view, if there are morally justifiable reasons for God to allow evil, then God can still be called all-good, even though God does not intervene to stop evil or suffering.
According to the inductive view, however, morally unjustified suffering exists. Because of this, God must either be less than all-good or less than all-powerful. If God exists, this view says, then no unjustified suffering would exist. This view is defended against by the claim that God knows more--especially concerning what is for the ultimate good of God’s creation--than human beings can possibly know. Because humans do not have all of the facts, so to speak, that would allow us to evaluate the moral rightness of God’s actions, we can not determine what is an is not morally permissible.
These theodicies fall short of justifying the existence of an all-powerful and all-good God. Firstly, they fail to account for the fact that the actions of moral agents can be justified without reference to a god of any kind. They also fail to recognize that any form of “evil” that is not the work of a moral agent (such as a natural disaster) can be explained rationally and empirically--again, without reference to a god. Finally, there are some acts of cruelty--such as the suffering of innocents during the holocaust and the transatlantic slave trade--that preclude any claims to a “divine plan” as a means of justification. One wonders is there could be any “plan” so perfect as to morally justify a hands-off God in such scenarios.
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